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Abstract Space systems have become a key enabler for a
wide variety of applications that are vital to the functioning
of advanced societies. The trend is one of quantitative and
qualitative increase of this dependence, so much so that
space systems have been described as a new example of
critical infrastructure. This article argues that the existence
of critical space infrastructures implies the emergence of a
new category of disasters related to disruption risks. We
inventory those risks and make policy recommendations
for what is, ultimately, a resilience governance issue.
Keywords Complex systems · Infrastructure
disruption · Resilience governance · Space
infrastructure · System interdependencies
1 Introduction
Certain categories of space systems, mainly satellites
orbiting the Earth at various altitudes, have become com-
ponents of critical infrastructures and critical infrastructure
system-of-systems. They have done so through their
capacity for the provision of unique services or of services
that are difficult to substitute sustainably through non-
space alternatives. These services are varied and include, in
a rough breakdown, capabilities related to Earth observa-
tion, communications, command, control, and coordina-
tion, as well as navigation, positioning, and timing. Their
applications are many and varied—from weather observa-
tions to data collection, from coordinating global supply
chains to maintaining integrity for complex electricity grids
or global databases. The users are numerous and, through
interdependencies, the ultimate beneficiaries extend
throughout the world, impacting individuals, businesses,
and nations. Table 1 describes the applications of just one
type of space system, a Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) constellation.
Mureșan et al. (2016) argued that space systems are a
new type of critical infrastructure (CI), not just a distinct
component of the CI categories identified in the legislative
and administrative frameworks for critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) developed in the United States or the
European Union. This inclusion offers a toolbox for con-
ceptualizing critical space infrastructures (CSI) in the
wider system-of-systems, thereby establishing the premise
for actual resilience governance efforts, keeping in mind
two key criteria on which CIP theory is based:
● The scarcity of resources—material, computational, and
organizational—to dedicate to the protection of infras-
tructures, thereby establishing the need for a method-
ology of assessing criticality and a framework for
designating systems for protection;
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● The interdependencies of CI, which lead to the prop-
agation of risks, vulnerabilities, and threats (Georgescu
and Bucovețchi 2017).
These interdependencies, according to Gheorghe and
Schläpfer (2004), manifest through physical, cyber, geo-
graphical, and logical links. This means that, while there is
an ample debate surrounding the resilience of CI, an all-
hazards approach to CIP requires us to look at the risks
stemming from expanding and deepening dependencies on
CSI, which are easily transmissible through cyber and
logical links. Mureșan et al. (2016) specifically dealt with
critical energy infrastructure dependencies on space sys-
tems. The urgency of the inclusion of CSI into our calculus
for dealing with crisis and emergency situations stems from
the basic literature on CIP, which holds that a complex
system-of-systems is subject to cascading failures (serial
infrastructure disruption), escalating failures (the severity
of disruption increases with mounting feedback loops), and
common cause failures (multiple infrastructures fail from
the same origin point; Rinaldi et al. 2001), thereby
enhancing system impact.
As Mureșan and Georgescu (2015) noted, space systems
operate in one of the most challenging environments
known and accessible to man. They are subject not only to
manifestations of specific space phenomena, such as space
weather and orbital debris impact, but also to the general
harshness of their environment, in which temperatures,
radiation, and other normal factors generate a high proba-
bility of spontaneous malfunction. At the same time, there
are deliberate threats to space systems, facilitated by
specific weaknesses and by an evolving international
landscape of space actors, including not just rational states,
but also rogue states and non-state actors with various
levels of access to increasingly facile antisatellite weap-
onry (Gheorghe and Vamanu 2007).
This article briefly sketches three risks—space debris,
space weather, deliberate threats—and formulates policy
recommendations to address the wider challenges of resi-
lience governance in the “orbital commons.”
2 Space Debris
Space debris (Table 2) encompasses the natural and arti-
ficial fragments of varying sizes that, given orbital veloc-
ities, may damage or destroy space systems through
impact. According to ESA (2018), of the 8650 satellites
placed in space by 5400 launches since the dawn of man-
ned exploration of space with the launch of Sputnik, 4700
were still present and 1800 were active systems by January
2018. The Space Surveillance Network tracks around
21,000 debris objects, with statistical models predicting the
existence of the 29,000 objects over 10 cm, 750,000 from
1 cm to 10 cm, and 166 million objects from 1 mm to 1 cm
(ESA 2018). Despite growing awareness of the issue and
the progress on measures dedicated to limiting debris
production (better shielding, better launch protocols, better
end-of-life management for systems including reentry;
Georgescu et al. 2016b), there are no means for cleaning up
existing debris.
Salter (2015) estimated that there are 6100 tons of debris
in orbit, with 2300 in low earth orbit (LEO). While space is
one of the least regenerative environments known to man,
LEO has, according to UCS (2017; Table 2), good reentry
times for debris. However, due to ease of access and the
high number of applications for space systems placed in
that particular band, it is also a favorite for megaconstel-
lation projects such as those envisioned by SpaceX or
Facebook, which would severely increase the issues. Col-
lisions between whole space systems are not unheard of.
3 Space Weather
Space weather phenomena encompass the conditions pro-
duced by the Sun or present in the ambient space envi-
ronment, including radiation or charged particles, which
may impact the functioning of space systems and,
depending on severity, of Earth-based systems. Commu-
nications may be jammed, or equipment damaged and
destroyed. Affected areas of human activity include the
functioning of various satellites, manned spaceflight, but
also terrestrial effects in communications, electricity grid
operation, and even the safety of pipelines through sub-
version of anticorrosion mechanisms.
Table 1 Generic applications stemming from GNSS capabilities
Space system category Capability Application examples
GNSS Navigation Road, air, maritime transport
Positioning Transport and general logistics (package tracking), precision agriculture
Timing Electricity grid operation, database synchronization, transaction dating and ordering in queues
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There is a significant literature attesting to the effects
that extreme space weather phenomena may have on global
society or on individual nations, as well as providing
analyses of the impact of past solar storm activity in par-
ticular. Baker et al. (2011) linked a vulnerable, aging, and
centralized US electricity grid to USD 2 trillion in damages
in the first year for the United States alone in case of a solar
storm comparable to the largest ever recorded, and recov-
ery times between 4 and 10 years. This does not include the
impact of disruption elsewhere, such as in Europe, or
resulting losses to the United States. The number of US
consumers that would be left without electricity would
approach 130 million (Baker et al. 2011).
As with space debris, there are technological means to
counteract the effects of space weather on individual sys-
tems—through shielding and resilient design, but these
inflict costs that many actors seek to avoid, absent
enforceable obligations or other stimuli—and also to han-
dle primary risk, leaving the transmitted risk from other
sources intact (Georgescu et al. 2016a).
4 Deliberate Threats
Deliberate threats to space systems are numerous, diverse,
and highly efficient. They are reliant on specific weak-
nesses of space systems, which include not only the indi-
vidual space asset, but also the communication links, the
control center, and the ties to other satellites in its con-
stellation. According to Georgescu et al. (2015a), a tax-





● Kinetic attacks with missiles;
● Electromagnetic attacks;
● De-orbiting by attacking with maneuver satellites;
● Passive attacks, by “mining” the space where that
system orbits.
A number of state actors have developed antisatellite
(ASAT) capabilities. While the public imagination is
overcome with the idea of high-tech, antisatellite weap-
onry, such as lasers and interceptors fired from fighter
planes, the truth is that ASAT capabilities are within the
grasp of non-state actors of low sophistication and
resources. As Gheorghe and Vamanu (2007) noted, an
assailant with a laptop can make what he wants of a
satellite, including veer it off course or compromise its
functioning in some other way. The cost-to-benefit ratio of
cyberattacks is very much in favor of the attacker, who
requires only a skilled individual with basic equipment and
an Internet connection. The difficulty in attributing an
attack as well as the low cost of failure makes this option
even more attractive. Other assailants may focus on jam-
ming the communication between the control center and
the satellite using off-the-shelf parts, and low-powered
lasers can be used to temporarily blind satellites passing
above an area that must be kept concealed.
The threats evolve to meet the constraints facing
attackers with fewer resources. Given the significant
Table 2 Various statistics regarding space debris
Origin of debris (NASA 2014) 42% from space system disintegration
22% as whole, but nonfunctioning, space systems
19% from mission specific activities
17% debris from launchers
Percentage of satellites in each major orbit category (UCS 2017) 49% in Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
6% in medium orbit
41% in geosynchronous orbit
4% in other orbits, including elliptical orbits
Reentry time for debris (NASA 2008) A few days, at lower than 125 miles altitude
A few years in the 125–370 miles altitude band
A few centuries, above 500 miles
Going towards geosynchronous orbits, persistence times are so high that
one can speak of permanent orbital presence





Int J Disaster Risk Sci
interdependencies of states utilizing the same space sys-
tems or orbital lanes for their critical space service con-
sumption requirements, as well as the possibility of
retaliation, there is a notable logic of “mutually assured
destruction” in space warfare that deters outright hostilities.
There are also significant factors that increase the vul-
nerability of space systems to deliberate threats (Georgescu
et al. 2015a):
● The predictability of CSI trajectory;
● The orbital dynamics of CSI relative to various regions
of Earth;
● The difficulty of CSI replacement, in terms of costs,
effort, and time;
● The efficiency of these attacks;
● The extraordinary cost–benefit ratios that some means
of attack offer;
● The lack of restraining concerns on the part of non-state
actors who do not care about retaliation in kind or the
wide disruption of critical space services.
5 Specific Challenges to Governance
Having described the three main threats to space systems,
we are now faced with the issue of tying these into a
coherent framework of thought that provides for resilience
governance. Resilience is the ability of a society or of a
system to recover from the materialization of a negative
event with minimum damage, in as little time as possible
and with as much of its original functionality as possible.
Governance relates not just to decision making, but also to
the tools, mechanisms, organizations, and mental modes
that influence that decision making.
Space systems in general and CSI, in particular, are also
contributors to resilience governance and to the crisis and
emergency situation management, providing valuable ser-
vices such as data gathering, communication, and coordi-
nation for other disasters, thereby increasing the
circumstantial criticality of space systems (Georgescu and
Bucovețchi 2017). Critical space infrastructure integrates
not just critical infrastructure, but also key assets and key
resources (such as the orbital bands the assets inhabit;
Gheorghe et al. 2018). As a subject and an object of crisis
and emergency situation management, CSI provides a key
to understanding one mechanism for crisis escalation, since
CSI failure may lead to a common cause failure both of a
series of infrastructures, as well as the capacity of the
competent actors to manage the crisis, thereby enabling its
escalation.
Governance is difficult in the space environment, since
its “international” character lacks the clear jurisdictional
boundaries that inform CIP processes on Earth. The
emerging jurisdictional issue of transcontinental infras-
tructure protection (pipelines, trade routes, and so on),
illustrates the inherent problem of CSI protection. The
existing space governance framework, painstakingly built
over decades, is geared towards consensus, making it
unsuited for collective action. Without the ability to
enforce technical standards, punish their violation, and
extract the cost of externalities from the perpetrators
through clear and enforceable assignment of liability, the
“global commons” begins to suffer from a variant of the
“tragedy of the commons.” Polluters may continue to do so
while sharing risks with nonpolluters. The material
advantages stemming from underinvestment in system
robustness confers an advantage that incentivizes a race to
the bottom in terms of security investment and the main-
tenance of redundant capacity. And, overall, there is no
clear body or a body of law for solving the disputes that
inevitably arise not just between states, but between private
parties. More and more of the identifiable CSI are owned,
operated, and administered by private entities, increasingly
mirroring the state of critical infrastructure in the West,
where 70–75% of CI are in private hands. Specific devel-
opments in the space industry lower the barriers of access
to space, inevitably promoting non-state involvement in
space by universities, private businesses, and others.
The literature in the field underscores the lack of pre-
paredness of competent authorities and infrastructure
operators during the materialization of phenomena like
space weather. A crisis of capacity could easily be trig-
gered in the space system-of-systems and transcends geo-
graphic or jurisdictional boundaries, making responses that
much more difficult. They involve coordination and acting
under incomplete information, not just situational, but also
with regard to the actions of peer responders, compounding
the issues stemming from a crisis and hindering efforts at
breaking the chain of cascading disruption and returning to
normality.
For this reason, we make the following policy pre-
scriptions, based on issues of governance. Firstly, the main
space actors must agree on key resilience measures,
implement them and enforce them unilaterally on third
parties, such as corporations or other states. This is espe-
cially important, since not only are more states trying to
access space, but this may also encourage jurisdiction
shopping on the part of established corporate space actors.
The current UN body, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS), should be invested with the
authority to monitor and recommend sanctions, since it
already has policy-making and technical capacities.
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Secondly, it is important to focus on changing the
incentive structure and, therefore, the behavior, of private
entities engaged in space, since the lion’s share of CSI
expansion will likely be a result of private development.
Gheorghe and Yuchnovicz (2015) proposed a space vul-
nerability cadaster as a representation of risk to space
systems that would be legible to private companies, banks,
and insurance companies. Insurance premiums could favor
companies that invest in shielding, or whose systems
operate in, low-debris density orbits. Georgescu (2017) fits
this proposal into a market governance model for space
systems, which complements the state-driven models
identified for the United States and the European Union by
Akhtar et al. (2017). A market governance model provides
an incentive structure for emergent behavior on the part of
rational actors seeking to maximize utility. With such
incentives in place, actors will find themselves more likely
to consider the costs of compliance with standards and
norms in a positive light, since it leads to indirect benefits
from third parties basing a financially relevant assessment
of that actor on security, as well as avoiding penalties.
Thirdly, it is vital to invest in measures that ensure a
more coherent space environment, to enable states and
companies to substitute one space system for another in
terms of short-term provisioning of critical space services.
This requires interoperability of systems and clear lines of
communication, as well as preexisting agreements to more
easily enable the system-of-systems to bring its extra
capacity into play. Useful examples in this sense are the
International Disaster Charter and Sentinel Asia initiatives,
which focus on providing critical space capabilities in
crisis situations. Georgescu et al. (2015b) recounted that,
during the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Japan
was also faced with the spontaneous loss of its main Earth
observation platform, Advanced Land Observation Satel-
lite (ALOS), which was quickly mitigated by partner
nations with their respective assets. Such ease of cooper-
ation must be generalized, in order to ensure timely access
to various resources. This should take place under the
auspices of an existing and legitimate international orga-
nization or forum, whose remit would simply be expanded.
6 Conclusion
Space systems are an unalienable component of high-
functioning system-of-systems, providing critical services
for geographically and functionally expansive critical
infrastructure systems, while also becoming critical
infrastructures in themselves. This increasing dependence
generates new risks, vulnerabilities, and threats, as well as
new horizons for the scope of cascading disruption of
critical infrastructures. The specificities of the orbital
environment demand collective action to manage the new
risks, which action is beyond the possibility of the current
system of space governance. Therefore, after presenting the
key specific threats to space systems, we advance proposals
for the resilience governance of these systems and,
specifically, of those designated critical space
infrastructures.
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